Belgorod-Khar'kov Offensive Operation
|combatant2= |commander1= Erich von Manstein |commander2= Ivan Konev |strength1=Army Group South Army Group "Kempf" 8th Army XI Army Corps |strength2=Steppe Front 5th Guards Tank Army 57th Army 69th Army 7th Guards Army 800 Tanks Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzer Corps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 pp 322-327 |casualties2=450 Tanks }} The Belgorod-Khar'kov Offensive Operation or Fourth Battle of Kharkov (12 August 1943 - 23 August 1943) was an operation conducted as part of Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev between the Red Army and Wehrmacht forces around the city of Kharkov (now Kharkiv) . It was one of the operations that followed the Battle of Kursk. Prelude Following the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army launched Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev on 3 August 1943, which aimed to retake the cities of Belgorod and Kharkov (now Kharkiv) . On the first day, the units of the Voronezh Front quickly penetrated the German front-line defences on the boundary of the 4th Panzer Army and Army Group "Kempf", between Tomarovka and Belgorod and gained 100 kilometres in a sector along the Akhtyrka-Bogodukhov-Olshany-Zolochev line along the banks of the Merla river. By 12 August where they were finally halted by German armoured units of the III Panzer Corps. On 5 August 1943 XI Corps evacuated the city of Belgorod. (see Belgorod-Bogodukhov Offensive Operation) Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945 bt Steven H Newton 2003 pp213-215 Following its withdrawal from Belgorod on the night of 5/6 August 1943 the XI Army Corps under the command of (Raus) now held defensive positions south of the city between the Donets & Lopan Rivers north of Kharkov. The XI Army Corps consisted of a Kampfgruppe from the 167th Infantry Division, the 168th, 106th, 198th, 320th Infantry Divisions, and the 6th Panzer Division which acted as was the corps reserve.Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945 by Steven H Newton Da Capo Press edition 2003 pp213-216 This constituted a deep salient east into Soviet lines and was subject to outflanking attempts on the corps left flank, indeed Soviet armoured units had already appeared 20 miles behind the corps front line. XI Army Corps now made a series of phased withdrawals toward Kharkov to prevent encirclement. Only reaching the final defenses north of the city on 12 August 1943, following breakthroughs by the 57th & 69th armies in several sectors of the front-line, the disintegration of the 168th Infantry Division and after an intervention by the corps reserve. When its attempts to force a breakthrough in the Bogodukhov-Olshany-Zolochev met with frustration along the Merla River, the Steppe Front directed its assaults towards Korotich, a sector held by 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich to cut the Poltava-Kharkov rail link. Fierce fighting ensued, in which Korotich was captured by the 5th Guards Mechanised Corps and subsequently recaptured by grenadiers from 2nd SS then to remain under German control, but the 5th Guards Tank Army (Pavel Rotmistrov) did cut the rail link finally on 22 August 1943.Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzer Corps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 Page 324 The loss of this vital line of communication; while not fatal in itself, was a serious blow to the ability of Army Group Kempf, to defend the city from the constant Red Army attacks. This meant critical delays of supplies and reinforcements, and the unit's position was becoming increasingly untenable. The way to Poltava now remained open, but Vatutin hesitated to push through while the Germans flanking the gap held firm. Instead, he turned his left flank armies; the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Guards Army, against the western front of Army Group Kempf where the 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions fought to keep the front angled south westward away from Kharkov. On the weaker east front of Army Group Kempf, the Soviet 57th Army cleared the right bank of the Donets between Chuguyev & Zmiyev, but the army command somehow could not quite bring itself to try for a full scale breakthrough.Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by Earl F Ziemke by Dorset Press 1968 page 154 These threats had led to a request by General Werner Kempf to abandon the city on 12 August 1943. Erich von Manstein did not object, but Adolf Hitler countered with an order that the city had to be held "under all circumstances". After a prediction that the order to hold Kharkov would produce "another Stalingrad", on 14 August 1943 Manstein relieved Kempf and appointed General Otto Wöhler in his place. A few days later, Army Group Kempf was renamed the 8th Army.Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by Earl F Ziemke by Dorset Press 1968 page 153 Kharkov now constituted a deep German salient to the east, which prevented the red army from making use of this vital traffic and supply centre. Following boastful reports made by Soviet radio that Soviet troops had entered the city, when in fact it was still held by XI Army Corps, Joseph Stalin personally ordered its immediate capture.Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945 bt Steven H Newton 2003 Page 242 General Raus the officer commanding the city takes up the story: and twenty-five Sturmgeschütz III self propelled assault guns had hardly taken their positions on 20 August 1943 when the first large scale attack got underway. However the Russian tanks had been recognized while they were still assembling in the villages and flood plains of a brook valley. Within a few minutes heavily laden Stukas came on in wedge formation and unloaded their cargoes of destruction in well timed dives on the enemy tanks caught in this congested area. Dark fountains of earth erupted skyward and were followed by heavy thunderclaps and shocks that resembled an earthquake. These were the heaviest, two-ton bombs, designed for use against battleships, which were all that Luftflotte 4 had left to counter the Russian attack. Soon all the villages occupied by Soviet tanks lay in flames. A sea of dust and smoke clouds illuminated by the setting sun hung over the brook valley, while dark mushrooms of smoke from burning tanks stood out in stark contrast. This gruesome picture bore witness to an undertaking that left death & destruction in its wake, hitting the Russians so hard that they could no longer launch their projected attack that day, regardless of Joseph Stalin's order. Such a severe blow inflicted on the Soviets had purchased badly needed time for XI Armeecorps to reorganize."Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945 by Steven H Newton 2003 pp 242-243}} . The supply situation in Kharkov was now catastrophic; artillerymen after firing their last rounds, were abandoning their guns to fight as infantrymen. The army's supply depot had five trainloads of spare tank tracks leftover from "Zitadelle" but very little else. The high consumption of ammunition in the last month and a half had cut into supplies put aside for the last two weeks of August and the first two weeks of September; until the turn of the month the army would have to get along with fifty percent of its daily average requirements in artillery & tank ammunition. XI Army Corps now had a combat strength of only 4,000 infantrymen, one man for every ten yards of front.Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by Earl F Ziemke by Dorset Press 1968 page 156 General Erhard Raus explains the intensity of the constant Russian attacks: Wöhler, recognizing the hopelessness of the situation, did not prove anymore resolute, in view of the harsh realities facing the defenders of Kharkov, he knew that the depleted Infantry regiments could not hold their positions without copious artillery support. Two days after taking command of 8th Army, Wöhler also asked Manstein for permission to abandon the city. Regardless of Hitler's demand that the city be held, Wöhler & Manstein agreed that the city could not be defended for long, given the diminishing German strength and the overwhelming size of Soviet reserves. On 21 August 1943, Manstein gave his consent to withdraw from Kharkov. The largely destroyed Soviet city, which changed hands several times during the war, was about to be recaptured by the Soviets for the last time. During the day of 22 August 1943, the Germans began their exodus from the city under great pressure from the Soviets. The 57th & 69th Armies pushed in from three sides with the coming of daylight. The Soviets sensed that the Germans were evacuating Kharkov, due to the lessening of artillery fire and diminishing resistance in the front lines. Later in the day, thunderous explosions were heard as ammo dumps were blown. Large German columns were then observed leaving the city and the Soviet troops pushed into the town itself. Moving out of Kharkov to the south, the Germans desperately fought to hold open a corridor through which a withdrawal could be made. All along the corridor through which the 8th Army evacuated Kharkov, Soviet artillery and mortars pounded the withdrawal. Their planes gathered for the kill and attacked the German columns leaving the city, strafing & bombing the men & vehicles. After dark, the 89th Guards and 107th Rifle Divisions broke into the interior of the city, driving the last German rearguard detachments before them. Enormous fires were set by the Germans in hope of delaying the Soviet advance. The city became a hellish place of fire and smoke, artillery fire & desperate combat, punctuated by the explosions of supply dumps. By 0200 on 23 August 1943, elements of the 183rd Rifle Division pushed into the city centre, reached the huge ''Dzerzhinsky Square'' and met men from the 89th Rifle Division. The victorious Soviet troops hoisted a red banner over the city once again. By 1100, Kharkov and its outskirts had been liberated completely. The fourth and final battle for the city was over.The Road to Berlin John Erickson Westview Press 1983 Page 121 Aftermath By re-establishing a continuous front on Army Group South's left flank, the 4th Panzer Army and the 8th Army had for the moment, blunted a deadly thrust, but to the north and southeast fresh blows had already been dealt or were in the making. Employing the peculiar rippling effect that marked their offensives, the Red Army, thwarted in one place, had shifted to others. For the first time in the war they had the full strategic initiative, and they grasped it jealously without regard for economy of effort, tactical sophistication, or the danger of overreaching themselves.Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by Earl F Ziemke by Dorset Press 1968 page 158 The failure of Operation Citadel doomed the Germans to the permanent loss of the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front without any hope of regaining it, although Hitler refused to acknowledge it. The terrible losses in manpower that the Germans suffered in July and August 1943 severely crippled both Army Groups South & Centre. Operations Polkovodets Rumyantsev, along with the concurrent Operation Kutuzov marked the first time in the war that the Germans were not able to defeat a major Soviet offensive during the summer and regain their lost ground and the strategic initiative.Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzer Corps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 Page 330 Footnotes * Kharkov is the Russian language name of the city (Kharkiv the Ukrainian one); both Russian and Ukrainian were official languages in the Soviet Union.Language Policy in the Soviet Union by L.A. Grenoble & Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States by Routledge) * The 905th Assault Gun Battalion, & the 7th & 48th flak regiments armed with the legendary '88' guns were also part of the Reserve. * Hitler claimed the loss of Kharkov would damage German prestige, particularly in Turkey. In the spring the Turkish Commander in Chief had inspected the defences as a guest of Armeeabteilung Kempf & pronounced them "Impregnable". * 1st Battalion, the 2 SS Das Reich Panzer Regiment left for France in May 1943, before the Battle of Kursk to receive its 'Panther' Tanks only returning in late August 1943. Citations and notes References * '' Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps'', George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 ISBN 0-921991-35-5 * '' Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945'' by Steven H Newton Da Capo Press edition 2003 ISBN 0-306-81247-9 * '' Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East '' by Earl F Ziemke Dorset Press 1968 * '' The Road to Berlin by John Erickson Westview Press 1983 Sources * '' Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps'', George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 ISBN 0-921991-35-5 * '' Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945'' by Steven H Newton Da Capo Press edition 2003 ISBN 0-306-81247-9 * '' Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East '' by Earl F Ziemke Dorset Press 1968 * '' The Road to Berlin by John Erickson Westview Press 1983 Category:Battles and operations of the Soviet–German War Category:Strategic operations of the Red Army in World War II Category:Military operations of World War II involving Germany Category:Battles of Kharkov